By Ngo Van Long
This publication presents readers with a finished survey of types of dynamic video games in economics, together with an intensive assurance of various fields of functions. it is going to additionally speak about and clarify major strategies and methods utilized in dynamic video games, and tell readers of its significant advancements whereas equipping them with instruments and concepts that might relief within the formula of suggestions for difficulties. A Survey of Dynamic video games in Economics will curiosity those that desire to examine extra concerning the conceptions, techniques and versions which are utilized within the area of dynamic video games.
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Additional resources for A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics (Surveys on Theories in Economics and Business Administration)
0 e−rt WM dt subject to Z˙ = a − φ(Z) − τ and Z(0) = 0, Z(t) ≤ R. 6) The solution of the importer’s HJB equation yields a decision rule τ = g(Z). The exporter believes that the importer has a decision rule τ = g(Z). ) 0 e−rt p(a − p − g(Z))dt subject to Z˙ = a − p − g(Z) and Z(0) = 0, Z(t) ≤ R. 7) The solution of the exporter’s HJB equation yields a decision rule p = φ(Z). In a Nash equilibrium, expectations are correct, so Eq. 14) is indeed satisﬁed. 17) θ =a− Dynamic Games in Environmental Economics 45 As the stock of accumulated extraction increases toward the steady-state level, the consumer price rises monotonely to a.
The damage cost functions become inﬁnite for p > p¯. The players are two countries with utility functions that are linear in output (which equals emissions). They prove that if the countries co-operate, the pollution stock will converge, in ﬁnite time, to a steady-state level p∗ < p¯. In contrast, if they do not co-operate, there are two types of MPNE. The ﬁrst type of equilibrium is called the most rapid approach path (MRAP) equilibrium. The second type of equilibrium, called the “make-the-opponent-indiﬀerent” (MTOI) equilibrium, displays the properties that each country is indiﬀerent among all of its feasible choices.
1996) investigate a discrete-time, inﬁnite horizon model of global warming with a catastrophic threshold. The pollution stock, denoted by pt , is bounded above by p¯, interpreted as the critical level beyond which the system will collapse. The damage cost functions become inﬁnite for p > p¯. The players are two countries with utility functions that are linear in output (which equals emissions). They prove that if the countries co-operate, the pollution stock will converge, in ﬁnite time, to a steady-state level p∗ < p¯.
A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics (Surveys on Theories in Economics and Business Administration) by Ngo Van Long